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Abstract: This essay analyzes the approach of antitrust law toward excessive 
pricing, inquiring whether antitrust law should be enforced against excessive 
pricing as a matter of policy and/or fairness. Upon examination of basic 
concepts of price theory to explain why price matters, and brief review of 
literature regarding criteria to define excessive pricing, this essay concludes 
that excessive pricing should not be subject to prosecution as a matter of policy, 
but abusive pricing should be subject to prosecution as a matter of fairness, 
provided that the firm has significant market power and faces an inelastic 
demand curve. 
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Resumo: Este trabalho analisa a aplicação da lei concorrencial com relação a 
preços excessivos, questionando se a lei concorrencial deve ser aplicada contra 
preços excessivos por questões de política pública e/ou equidade. Mediante 
estudo de conceitos básicos de teoria do preço para explicar por que preços 
importam e breve revisão de doutrina sobre critérios para definir preços 
excessivos, conclui-se que preços excessivos não devem ser objeto de 
preocupação por questões de política pública, enquanto que preços abusivos 
devem ser objeto de preocupação por questões de equidade, contanto que o 
agente tenha poder de mercado significativo e encare demanda inelástica. 
Palavras-chave: política antitruste; preço excessivo; preço abusivo; teoria do 
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Introduction 
In every jurisdiction that has passed antitrust laws, authorities have 
struggled, at some point, with the following question: should the antitrust laws 
be enforced against excessive pricing?  
As noted by Frederick Abbott, such question denotes a paradox in 
antitrust policy, to the extent that many experts agree that one of the main 
objectives of antitrust law is, precisely, “to protect consumers against the 
charging of excessive prices”1. 
The treatment of excessive pricing remains, to this date, one of the 
most challenging issues of antitrust enforcement. On the one hand, there are 
numerous policy questions that must be addressed. How to determine when a 
price is excessive? Should there be a differentiation between excessive and 
abusive price? If a price is deemed excessive, can the antitrust authority 
determine what the fair price should be? If so, are there instruments or methods 
that enforcers may use to set forth the fair price? 
One the other hand, there are fairness arguments in favor of 
enforcement against excessive pricing, especially when the product in question 
is deemed essential (e.g., medicine). Should antitrust allow dominant firms to 
exploit consumers by charging excessive pricing? Is it fair to leave consumers 
unassisted when they are unable to acquire essential goods due to excessive 
pricing? 
Enforcers have generally refrained from applying antitrust law 
directly against excessive pricing2, “even though it is the incipient threat of 
future ‘excessive’ prices that motivates enforcement action against 
exclusionary behavior and cartels”3.  
In Brazil, the issue was addressed by Carlos Ragazzo, who argues that 
antitrust should fight the causes of the excessive pricing, and not the excessive 
pricing itself4. 
                                                     
1 ABBOTT, Frederick M. Excessive pharmaceutical prices and competition law: 
doctrinal development to protect public health. Available at 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=2719095>. Accessed on August 27, 2016. p. 2. 
2 ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT. 
Excessive prices. Available at 
<http://www.oecd.org/competition/abuse/49604207.pdf>. Accessed on August 27, 
2016. p. 2. 
3 Ibid. p. 2. 
4 RAGAZZO, Carlos Emmanuel Joppert. Preço abusivo, eficácia jurídica e análise 
econômica: afinal, onde está a cabeça de bacalhau? Revista do IBRAC, v. 18, p. 21-43, 
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Notwithstanding, the issue will inevitably reemerge from time to 
time, and it is reasonable to assume that, sooner or later, the Administrative 
Council for Economic Defese (“Cade”) will be required to take a firm stance 
regarding the treatment of excessive pricing. For example, the excessive pricing 
debate returned to the spotlight when, in the end of 2015, when the price of the 
drug Daraprim, used for treating life-threatening infection, rose from US$13,50 
to US$750,00, following the acquisition of the drug’s intellectual property by 
a firm5. 
The matter at hand is not an easy one, so this brief essay does not have 
the intention of providing all the answers for the daunting problem. Therefore, 
we will limit our subject to the following questions: (i) whether antitrust 
authorities should fight excessive pricing as a matter of policy; and (ii) whether 
antitrust authorities should fight excessive pricing as a matter of fairness. 
The first section of this essay will address the importance of price in 
a capitalist economy and how price variations affect welfare. A few basic 
concepts developed by price theory, that are useful for the issues discussed 
herein, will be explained. 
The second section will provide a brief overview two of the main 
problems faced by antitrust authorities when dealing with excessive pricing: 
where exactly to draw the line between fair and excessive prices and what are 
the implications of such issue. 
The third section will set forth a proposal to deal with excessive 
pricing. The proposal will be based on the idea that should be a differentiation 
between excessive pricing and abusive pricing. Thus, we will argue that 
excessive pricing should not be prosecuted by antitrust authorities as a matter 
of policy, whereas abusive pricing should be fought by antitrust authorities as 
                                                     
2011. Frederick M. Abbott criticizes such solutions, denominated by him as the “fixing 
the market” alternative. “There is a fundamental problem with the ‘fixing the market’ 
approach when addressing products protected by legislatively authorized market 
exclusivity mechanisms such as patents and regulatory marketing exclusivity. That is, 
mechanical aspects of the market are not broken in the conventional antitrust sense. 
Rather, the market has been designed without adequate control mechanisms or 
‘limiters’ that act to constrain exploitive behavior. Political institutions, such as 
legislatures, that might step in are constrained by political economy (e.g., lobbying), 
and do not respond as they should” (ABBOTT, Frederick M. Excessive 
pharmaceutical… p. 2). 
5 POLLACK, Andrew. Drug goes from $13.50 a tablet to $750, overnight. The New 
York Times, New York, 20 Sept. 2015. Available at 
<http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/21/business/a-huge-overnight-increase-in-a-drugs-
price-raises-protests.html?_r=0>. Accessed on August 27, 2016. 
REVISTA DO IBRAC Volume 22 - Número 2 - 2016 
36 
a matter of fairness. Accordingly, a few possibilities will be discussed about 
how to define abusive pricing. 
1. Why does price matter? 
Price is one of the most important (if not the most important) variable 
in a healthy capitalist market. Its main function is to show both to consumers 
and producers how much quantity of a certain good or service is desired6. Thus, 
price allows market participants to allocate scarce resources in the most 
efficient manner. 
From a social perspective, price has an additional meaning: it limits 
access to products. Expensive products are accessible to a small percentage of 
society, while cheap products are accessible to a larger group of people.  
The difference between how price is understood from a social and 
economic point of view leads to situations where high prices may be deemed 
unfair from a social perspective, but not from an economic perspective.  
But economics does not forgo the social impact of high prices 
altogether. It deals with the social issue arising from high prices by showing 
that a loss of welfare occurs whenever prices go up. In this context, it is said 
that a deadweight loss occurs whenever firms restrict output and extract rents 
from consumers. 
As explained by Posner, the deadweight loss is the loss suffered by 
society as a result of a price increase, which is not offset by the rent transferred 
to the firm by consumers7. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
6 For the sake of simplicity, “product” will be used hereinafter to mean both goods and 
services. 
7 POSNER, Richard. The social costs of monopoly and regulation. The Journal of 
Political Economy, Chicago, vol. 83, pp. 807-828, 1975. pp. 807-809. 
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Figure 1 - Deadweight loss representation8 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 shows the graphic representation of the deadweight loss 
generated by a price raising from P1 to P2, and a consequent restriction of 
output from Q1 to Q2. The area comprising L and D represents the loss yielded 
by the price raise. The square area marked as L is equivalent to the transfer of 
rent from consumers to the firm; in other words, it represents a loss of wealth 
by consumers, which is offset by a gain of wealth by the firm9. The triangle D, 
by its turn, represents the loss of wealth that is not rent transferred from 
consumers to the firm. In other words, area D is equivalent to the loss of wealth 
of non-consumers of the product in question, that now will be unable (or 
unwilling) to acquire it. It is a loss shared by all society and is not offset by a 
gain of wealth by the firm, which is why it is generally denominated as a 
deadweight10. 
                                                     
8 See original in Ibid. p. 808. 
9 It must be said that such offsetting is not deemed neutral from a welfare perspective 
by antitrust enforcers in most jurisdiction, since it is purely a transfer of rent. 
Williamson has proposed a more detailed tradeoff model specifying which type of 
welfare gains might be taken into account to offset a loss generated by a price raise. 
See WILLIAMSON, Oliver E. Economies as an antitrust defense: The Welfare 
Tradeoffs. The American Economic Review, Pittsburgh, Vol. 58, pp. 18-36, 1966; 
WILLIAMSON, Oliver E. Economies as an antitrust defense revisited. The University 
of Pennsylvania Law Review, Philadelphia, Vol. 125, pp. 699-736, 1977. 
10 The explanation of the deadweight loss graphical representation is derived from basic 
principles of price theory and it has been set forth by many economists. 
Notwithstanding, many of these assumptions and more sophisticated models based on 
such assumptions may be found in POSNER, Richard. The social costs of monopoly 
and regulation. The Journal of Political Economy, Chicago, vol. 83, pp. 807-828, 1975.  
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The deadweight loss, therefore, is the closest economic representation 
of the main social issue generated by high prices: it excludes a certain number 
of people from the market. In theory, the larger the triangle D, the higher the 
number of people who are kept from consuming the product in question. 
The exclusion of consumers from market and loss of welfare are the 
reason why one of the main concerns of antitrust is keeping prices at the lowest 
levels possible11 (together with increasing product quality and innovation).  
Price theory can also demonstrate how valuable a product is not only 
by pointing out its demand curve, but also by showing how rigidly demand 
reacts to a price raise. The degree to which demand reacts to changes in price 
is called elasticity. If, as a result of a price increase, there is a proportionately 
small decrease in demand, it is said that the demand curve is inelastic. If, 
however, there is a proportionately large decrease in demand in response to a 
price increase, the demand is deemed elastic. 
An inelastic demand occurs when the product in question does not 
have close substitutes and it is somehow essential to consumers. Medicines, for 
example, will probably have an inelastic demand if they are essential and have 
no close substitutes. In those cases, the consumer is “locked” to the product, 
and even substantial increases in price might not be sufficient to lower 
demand12. 
                                                     
11 The lowest level that a firm can set its price, according to price theory, is where 
demand curve intersects with the firm’s marginal cost curve. Below that point, firms 
would be offering their products at a loss, which would not be a rational economic 
behavior. However, this would only occur in perfectly competitive markets, which is 
rarely the case. This is why we state that antitrust seeks to keep prices as low as possible 
under given market circumstances, which is not to say that the lowest level possible 
cannot be substantially above the firm’s marginal cost. Even though this affirmation 
may be unsettling to some antitrust scholars and practitioners, we believe that stating 
the opposite would be clearly wrong (e.g., “keeping prices at the lowest levels possible 
is not among the main concerns of antitrust policy”). In that context, there are 
arguments in favor of choosing consumer surplus (which is a result of low prices) as a 
priority of antitrust policy. See, for example, Russell Pittman argument in favor of 
consumer’s surplus as the main antitrust standard in the analysis of mergers. 
PITTMAN, Russell. Consumer Surplus as the Appropriate Standard for Antitrust 
Enforcement. Available at <http://ssrn.com/abstract=996643>. Accessed on September 
15, 2016. pp. 12-13. 
12 “As a monopolist or as a potential cartelist, you would like to be facing a demand 
curve that is inelastic above the competitive price. That means that it will be really 
profitable to raise prices to the monopoly level because the industry will not lose many 
sales but will get higher prices for what is sold”. See GRADY, Mark F. Cases and 
materials on antitrust. Los Angeles [s.n.], 2016. 1074 p. p. 18. 
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The implications of low elasticity are not ignored by antitrust 
authorities. The Horizontal Merger Guidelines of the U.S. Federal Trade 
Commission and Department of Justice, for example, determines that 
restriction of output is more likely to occur as a result of a merger if: (i) the 
resulting firm has relatively high market share; (ii) the output of the firm already 
committed to price levels prior to the price increase is relatively low; (iii) the 
margin of the suppressed output is relatively low; (iv) response of rivals to the 
restriction of output is not significant; and (v) the market elasticity of demand 
is low13. 
Low elasticity of demand, therefore, is a strong indication that the 
product is somehow essential to consumers14 and there are no viable options 
(i.e., close substitutes) available in case of a price increase.  
Therefore, it might be said – especially from a social, if not 
economical, perspective – that price increases are more harmful in case of 
products with inelastic demand. People who need the product will be forced to 
transfer a bigger share of their wealth to the dominant firm, otherwise they will 
not be able to acquire the quantity that they need.  
If the demand is elastic, price increases would have little effect on 
welfare (even though there would still be a deadweight loss), since consumers 
would simply be able to switch to a substitute product or stop consuming the 
product altogether. 
In summary, price matters not only because of its economic role of 
allocating scarce resources efficiently, but also because it dictates how many 
people will be able to have access to products. 
The questions that arise, therefore, are: (i) if price matters, and 
dominant firms may raise their prices and exclude several consumers from the 
market, should antitrust do something about it? (ii) if the answer is positive, 
where should antitrust authorities draw the line between cases where they must 
intervene and cases where they should leave it to the market to correct the issue? 
2. The difficult task of defining excessive pricing 
The determination of fair price has been a subject of study for many 
economists. Evans and Padilla identify three main criteria used by economists 
                                                     
13 FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION; DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE. Horizontal 
Merger Guidelines. Available at <https://www.ftc.gov/>. Accessed on September 16, 
2016. p. 23. 
14 If a product does not have close substitutes, but is not essential, consumers would 
simply stop buying it in case of a price increase, which would lead to an elastic demand. 
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to analyze the fairness of prices: production cost, competitive pricing and profit 
margin15.  
The production-cost approach was used by Marxist economists and 
classical economists to determine fair price. Accordingly, the fair price of a 
product would be “equal to the value of labor involved in its production”16. It 
might be said that this approach has been completely disregarded by modern 
antitrust policy. 
Neo-classical economists, as well as the ordo-liberal school of 
economic thought, argue that the main drive of fair price is competition. In this 
sense, fair price “would result from the free interaction of demand and supply 
in a competitive market”17.  
Evans and Padilla point to a number of practical issues that would 
arise from this approach. According to the authors, while in competitive and 
static markets the competitive price would be given by the incremental cost of 
production (in other words, the point at which marginal cost approaches and/or 
intersect demand), establishing competitive price in dynamic and concentrated 
markets would be substantially more complex18. In dynamic industries, the 
price is not established according to marginal cost, but rather on consumers’ 
“willingness to pay as to cover fixed costs in the least output restricting way”19. 
In oligopolistic markets, for example, price will be set forth above marginal 
cost (and, depending on the level of output restriction, substantially above it). 
In addition to production cost and competitive pricing, Evans and 
Padilla state that some economists have relied on the idea of profit 
benchmarking to determine fair price. Under this method, price would be 
deemed abusive if profits are “higher than [firms] could expect to earn in an 
otherwise identical competitive market”, in which case the return on capital of 
the firm would be “greater than its weighted average cost of capital”20.  
The authors raise several issues to this approach, such as the existence 
of strategies based on the maximization of the profits earned on a group of 
products rather than a single product, manufacturing carried out across multiple 
company’s divisions and countries, and the absence of relevant variables in the 
                                                     
15 PADILLA, Jorge; EVANS, David S. Excessive Prices: Using Economics to Define 
Administrable Legal Rules. Available at <http://ssrn.com/abstract=620402>. Accessed 
on September 11, 2016. pp. 5-8. 
16 Ibid. p. 5. 
17 Ibid. p. 5. 
18 Ibid. p. 6. 
19 Ibid. p. 6. 
20 Ibid. p. 6. 
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accounting of business profits, such as past research and development 
expenditures and costs associated with risk21. 
Another problem of using profit benchmarking to determine whether 
or not price is excessive is that some firms may have high profits even though 
they are charging competitive prices. Suppose that firm A has a R$10,00 
average production cost per unit and all other firms have a R$20,00 average 
production cost per unit, but they all charge R$25,00 for their product. Should 
firm A’s price be deemed excessive because its profit margin is higher than its 
competitor’s? If the answer is yes, then antitrust policy would be punishing firm 
A for being more efficient than its rivals. 
As a result, if profits should be used as benchmark for defining 
excessive pricing, antitrust enforcers would have to engage in the complicated 
task of determining the nature of the rent transferred to the firm.  
Economists often classify rents transferred to firms as Ricardian 
(scarcity rents), Schumpterian (entrepreneurial rents) or Porterian (monopoly 
rents)22. 
Ricardian rents are those derived from scarcity of goods. A firm may 
charge high prices not because it is abusing its market power, but simply 
because it does not have enough inputs to increase its output23. Even if the firm 
had stockpiled the scarce input in anticipation of its shortage, in which case the 
firm would in theory be able expand production even if temporarily, it might 
be that raising output would be inefficient, as price would not properly reflect 
the scarcity of the good in question. Accordingly, in the hypothetical context of 
an innovative firm with high profit margin, Sidak and Teece explain that such 
firm “may have both a high market share and be highly profitable, but this profit 
in no way implies that it is exercising socially undesirable restraint over its 
output”, since it would be “simply collecting sufficient Ricardian rents to 
recover its initial investment and offer encouragement to other innovators and 
entrepreneurs”24. 
The Schumpterian or entrepreneurial rents occur when a firm 
develops a new technology or method that provides it with a competitive edge 
over its competitors, allowing the firm to charge a higher price to consumers or 
                                                     
21 Ibid. pp. 6-7. 
22 SIDAK, J. Gregory; TEECE, David J. Comments of J. Gregory Sidak and David J. 
Teece before the Federal Trade Commission & U.S. Department of Justice on the 
Horizontal Merger Guidelines Review Project. Available at < 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1504706>. Access on September 14, 2016. p. 11. 
23 Ibid. p. 11. 
24 Ibid. p. 13. 
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to offer the same price as before, but with higher profit margin due to lower 
costs. There is no question as to the desirability of firms collecting 
Schumpterian rents, as it creates incentives for innovation and technological 
progress25.  
Lastly, monopoly rents are those collected by firms exercising their 
market power. Those rents might be the result of anticompetitive conducts and 
are the main concern of antitrust policy26. However, monopoly rents may also 
be collected by firms that have monopolized their markets through superior 
efficiency, and it is doubtful that antitrust policy should intervene in such 
circumstances. After all, collecting monopoly profits is the single biggest 
incentive for firms to be efficient and innovative. 
It seems, therefore, that any criteria picked by antitrust authorities to 
draw the line between fair and excessive pricing is bound to raise several 
practical issues. While economics does not offer a reliable test to identify 
excessive pricing, Courts have also struggled with the subject. 
In Brazil, Cade has never punished firms for excessive pricing, even 
though many complaints have been filed and analyzed by the authority27. 
Evans and Padilla report a couple of cases in which European 
authorities have condemned excessive pricing as a standalone infringement28. 
In Case CA98/2/2001, the Office of Fair Trading (“OFT”) concluded that Napp 
Pharmaceuticals Holdings Ltd had established excessive prices for some of its 
products. According to Evans and Padilla, the OFT reached such conclusion 
based on a “preponderance-of-evidence” approach, through which the authority 
took into consideration costs, price and profitability benchmarks29.  
The European Commission, by its turn, punished United Brands for 
excessive pricing in Case 27/76 (herein after “United Brands”). According to 
Evans and Padilla, the Commission adopted a two-step test; “First, the test 
requires comparing actual costs and prices. Second, the test requires 
                                                     
25 Ibid. p. 14. 
26 “The type of rent that ought to be the target of antitrust concern stems from the naked 
exercise of market power by a firm. These circumstances might arise because of 
exclusionary conduct lacking efficiency justifications” (Ibid. p. 15). 
27 RAGAZZO, Carlos Emmanuel Joppert. A eficácia jurídica da norma de preço 
abusivo. Available at <http://works.bepress.com/carlos_ragazzo/16/>. Accessed on 
September 14, 2016. p. 189. 
28 PADILLA, Jorge; EVANS, David S. Excessive Prices: Using Economics… pp. 8-
15. 
29 Ibid. pp. 16-17. 
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determining whether a price is excessive in itself or by comparison to 
competitor’s products”30.  
Both methods (preponderance of evidence and the United Brands’ 
two-step test) have their shortcomings and might be problematic in practice for 
the reasons explained above with respect to using benchmarking approaches. 
As a result, there is a chance that “supra-competitive prices will be blessed in 
some instances, while competitive prices will be condemned in others”31.  
Although Evans and Padilla argue that, from the perspective of an 
efficient antitrust policy, excessive pricing should be per se legal32, they go on 
to suggest a test capable of detecting excessive pricing in a more rational 
manner, which is comprised of three cumulative conditions: (i) the firm must 
have a monopoly that is the result of past investments or innovation and is 
protected by insurmountable legal barriers to entry; (ii) the price set forth by 
the firm widely exceeds its average total cost; and (iii) the high price might 
impair the emergence of new products in adjacent markets33.  
A few aspects of such test must be addressed. Given the fact that the 
first condition proposed by the test requires the existence of insurmountable 
legal barriers to entry, it is implied that the law should only fight excessive 
pricing when the law itself was part of the problem. If the legal barriers are 
related to intellectual property protection, the question of whether antitrust 
should intervene to lower down the innovator’s price is a complicated one, and 
it might be that intellectual property laws would be a better mechanism to solve 
the problem (for example, through compulsory licensing, which is possible 
remedy under Brazilian law). If, however, the legal barriers were created by 
other laws or regulations, then competition advocacy might arguably be a better 
alternative than antitrust intervention to lower the legal barriers. 
The third condition imposes on the plaintiff the burden of 
demonstrating, in a counterfactual scenario, that new products would emerge 
in an adjacent market if the price of the product in question was lower. This 
condition would make a claim brought under the proposed test resemble a 
market foreclosure case rather than an excessive pricing one (e.g., “I cannot 
develop my product A because the price of input B is too high, and the producer 
                                                     
30 Ibid. p. 15. 
31 Ibid. p. 22. 
32 “The advantage of specifying a common per se legal standard for all excessive 
pricing cases is that it greatly simplifies the application of the law, providing firms with 
a more certain legal environment and allowing competition authorities to focus on other 
more grievous offences” (Ibid. p. 29). 
33 Ibid. p. 29. 
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of input B is a monopolist shielded from competition by insurmountable legal 
barriers”). Accordingly, additional questions would arise: can antitrust 
authorities punish a firm for supposedly foreclosing a market that does not exist 
(and might not come to existence even if the prices are lower)? What happens 
if price is lowered, but no new product emerges? If the adjacent market already 
exists and the party bringing the claim is a competitor of the defendant in such 
market, should the test be applied differently34? 
Akman and Garrod propose a different test to define excessive 
pricing, using the United Brands method as the starting point35. According to 
the authors, in United Brands, the European Commission established that price 
would be deemed excessive if (i) the price-cost margin is excessive, and (ii) the 
price is unfair in itself or in comparison with that of similar products36. The 
authors argue that such test may not be a good guidance to firms, which may 
lead to uncertainty and, consequently, loss of welfare37.  
Therefore, they propose a different test, comprised of three steps38. In 
the first step, the antitrust authority would compare the price in question with 
that of a given reference transaction, looking for any discrepancies between 
both. If a significant price difference is found, the authority would apply the 
second step, to determine if the firm has obtained gains in expense of 
consumers. If the answer is positive, then a third and last step would follow, in 
which the antitrust authority would inquire whether the transfer of rent at the 
expense of consumers is the result of changes in the market (supply and 
demand) or simply the result of lack of competition. If the reason for the 
excessive price is lack of competition, then the antitrust authority should 
intervene39. 
                                                     
34 The possibility of market foreclosure was the essence of Commissioner Paulo 
Furquim’s test proposed in the judgment of process no. 08012.005181/2006-37. See 
RAGAZZO, Carlos Emmanuel Joppert. A eficácia jurídica… pp. 190-191. 
35 AKMAN, Pinar; GARROD, Luke. When are excessive prices unfair? Available at 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=1578181>. Accessed on September 14, 2016.  
36 Ibid. p. 2. 
37 Ibid. pp. 4-5. 
38 For a detailed description of such test, see Ibid. pp. 10-13.  
39 The authors also mention “competition issues” as grounds for intervention under the 
third step, although it is not clear if the expression should be understood as synonym of 
“lack of competition”. The difference is relevant, as lack of competition might not be 
the result of competition issues (from an antitrust perspective). In this sense: 
“[a]lthough the principle of dual entitlement deems prices unfair with respect to 
exogenous fluctuations in supply and demand, in our procedure prices should only be 
found unfair if they are unfair due to competition issues. Consequently, an abuse should 
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The underlying principle of the Akman-Garrod test seems to be that 
firms should not be allowed to (excessively) extract rents from consumers due 
to lack of competition. Even though such principle seems right and fair at first 
glance, one might argue that lack of competition may be the result of superior 
efficiency by the monopolist firm and, as stated before, it is doubtful that a 
policy forbidding efficient firms to charge monopoly prices is beneficial in the 
long run. That is probably the reason why the authors argue, in their conclusion, 
that antitrust policy should focus on the causes of the lack of competition rather 
than its effects (excessive price)40. 
Carlos Ragazzo, by his turn, propose that excessive pricing 
prosecution should be forgone altogether41. Aside from the several policy 
reasons for not pursuing prosecution of such practices, already addressed 
above, the author argues that under the new Brazilian antitrust statute (Law no. 
12,529/2011), excessive pricing was excluded from the non-exhaustive list of 
anticompetitive practices subject to prosecution contained in article 36, § 3. 
Ragazzo recognizes, however, that the practice can still be prosecuted in Brazil 
under the catch-all provision set forth in article 36. 
3. Addressing excessive pricing: a proposal 
As addressed above, defining general rules to guide antitrust 
authorities with respect to legal treatment of excessive pricing is difficult, if not 
impossible (or at least inadvisable).  
Notwithstanding, there are conducts, as demonstrated by the 
Daraprim price increase, that are facially unreasonable and arguably should not 
be allowed by antitrust law as a matter of fairness. Those are situations where 
the price is not only excessive, but is also abusive. 
Accordingly, even though we agree with arguments that, as a matter 
of policy, prosecuting excessive pricing is simply not effective, we nevertheless 
think that antitrust authorities should intervene if: (i) the price is so high as to 
be considered not only excessive, but abusive; and (ii) the demand for the 
product in question is inelastic. 
Antitrust doctrine has often relied upon concepts that are somehow 
vague and subjective, such as reasonableness and abusiveness, but nevertheless 
                                                     
only be found if the firm gains sufficiently at the expense of customers due to a lack of 
competition” (Ibid. p. 13). 
40 Ibid. p. 19. 
41 RAGAZZO, Carlos Emmanuel Joppert. A eficácia jurídica… p. 208. 
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can be applied with an acceptable degree of certainty and predictability by 
Courts and administrative tribunals. 
In the United States of America, for example, the idea of 
reasonableness has been used since the early years of the Sherman Act to 
interpret the overreaching language contained in the Section 1 of said statute. 
Since the dissenting opinion issued by Justice White in Standard Oil42, U.S. 
Courts have developed the rule of reason to determine which types of restrains 
of trade are forbidden under Section 1 of the Sherman Act.  
The rule was further specified and detailed through case law, with the 
development of concepts such as naked restrains and ancillary restrains43. Such 
concepts have been used as aids to determine when the rule of reason should be 
applied and how flexible its application should be (e.g. full rule of reason or 
truncated rule of reason44). 
In addition, the idea of abusiveness is not new to Brazilian law. 
According to article 187 of Law no. 10.406/2002 (Civil Code), abuse of right 
occurs whenever a person manifestly exceeds the limits of a right, taking into 
consideration the social or economic purpose of the right in question, as well 
as standards of good faith and good costumes. Specifically, the concept of 
abusiveness has been used by Cade in sham litigation cases.  
In the administrative process no. 08012.004484/2005-51, 
Commissioner Cesar Mattos used the concept of abusive exercise of a right to 
define the requirements for the characterization of sham litigation. According 
to the Commissioner, “the abuse of a right arises from the irregular use of such 
right, with a different purpose than that originally recognized for the right in 
question” and, consequently, the Law, as a tool of moral valuation, “oriented to 
ensure order, safety and social peace, is violated by the abusive exercise of a 
right”45.  
The abuse of right is inherently flexible and, consequently, it would 
be difficult to formulate a definition that could be applied broadly. Also, its 
characterization depends heavily on the facts of the case. However, it seems to 
                                                     
42 Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911). 
43 The creation of these concepts is generally attributed to Justice Taft’s opinion in 
Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States 175 U.S. 211 (1899). 
44 See, for example, NCAA v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma, 468 
U.S. 85 (1984); FTC v. Indiana Federation of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986); and 
PolyGram Holding, Inc. v. FTC, 416 F.3d 29. (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
45 Page 9 of concurring opinion issued by Commissioner Cesar Mattos in the 
administrative process no. 08012.004484/2005-51. 
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be generally accepted that the prohibition of the abuse of right establishes a 
standard of good-faith behavior. 
In this sense, Brazil’s Superior Court has decided that the holder of a 
subjective right may not exercise it in such a manner that “deviates from the 
theological sense (purpose or social function) of the norm that supports it 
(exceeding the limits of reasonableness)”46. 
The right to charge whatever price a firm wish was not granted by the 
Law so as to allow exploitation of consumers by charging abusively high prices. 
Therefore, it is hereby argued that antitrust should intervene if: (i) the price 
increase performed by a firm may be deemed abusive, and not merely 
excessive; (ii) the firm has significant market power, so as to make unlikely that 
the expansion of output by a competitor would neutralize, at least partially, the 
harmful effects of the abusive price; and (ii) the demand of the product in 
question is inelastic, so as to prevent consumers from switching to close 
substitutes or stopping to consumer the product altogether. 
Since the abuse of right is a matter of standard of behavior, the 
abusive price should be determined in accordance with past practices of the 
dominant firm. It might be said that firms are allowed (and even expected) to 
charge high prices as a reward for their efforts for being more efficient than 
their competitors. Such practice is in accordance with the social and economic 
purposes of free enterprise, as well as with good faith and good costumes. There 
is not, however, a general permission for firms to exploit consumers, especially 
if such consumers have no viable alternatives so as to avoid or mitigate such 
exploitation. 
In that sense, substantial increases in price in a short period of time 
that cannot be supported by any economic reason, or substantial price increases 
that can only be explained by concentration of market power, might be deemed 
abusive if demand is inelastic and therefore there is no possibility for the market 
to correct itself.  
We recognize that it is difficult, if not impracticable, to provide an 
accurate quantitative criterion for the characterization of abusiveness in a price 
increase. Any number proposed herein would be arbitrary. Notwithstanding, we 
believe that antitrust should not close its eyes completely to abusive pricing 
when the market is not capable of correcting the problem without intervention 
(i.e., when demand is inelastic). 
With respect to other excessive pricing situations (such as, for 
example, several non-substantial price increases throughout a prolonged period 
                                                     
46 Superior Court of Justice, REsp 1143216 / RS, J. Luiz Fux, judged on March 24, 
2010. 
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of time or maintenance of high prices for an extended period), we agree with 
Ragazzo that other laws – such as the intellectual property laws, consumer 
protection laws and sectoral regulation – may be more effective than antitrust 
in proving remedy47. 
Thus, as a matter of policy, antitrust authorities should not spend 
significant resources in prosecuting excessive pricing, since there seems to be 
no test capable of drawing a clear line between reasonable and excessive prices. 
As a matter of fairness, however, we believe antitrust enforcers should take 
action if a certain price increase is facially unreasonable and abusive, provided 
that the demand curve facing the firm is inelastic48. 
Conclusion 
This essay has addressed the problem of excessive pricing, with the 
purpose of determining if antitrust should be enforced against such practice as 
a matter of policy and/or as a matter of fairness. 
After a brief explanation about why price matters in a capitalist 
economy and how to draw a line between reasonable and excessive price, we 
concluded that: (i) price matters because it allows the market to allocate scarce 
resources efficiently and, from a social perspective, it limits the number of 
people who have access to a certain product; and (ii) scholars and policymakers 
have not been able to formulate a reliable test to detecting excessive pricing 
and, as a result, many scholars suggest that antitrust law should forgo excessive 
pricing prosecution altogether.  
Notwithstanding those findings, however, we concluded that there 
might be situations where prices are not only excessive, but are also abusive. In 
those situations, if the firm has substantial market power and faces an inelastic 
demand curve, antitrust law should address the problem.  
Therefore, we conclude that, even though antitrust should not be 
enforced against excessive pricing as a matter of policy, it should be enforced 
                                                     
47 RAGAZZO, Carlos Emmanuel Joppert. A eficácia jurídica… pp. 203-205. 
48 As explained by Mark Grady, “[t]he demands facing individual firms are more elastic 
than the demands facing entire industries”. See GRADY, Mark F. Cases and 
materials… p. 18. Stated backwards, this means that the demand curve facing an 
industry will be less elastic than those facing an individual firm, which means that the 
demand curve of the industry might be inelastic, whereas the firm may face an elastic 
demand curve. Therefore, we are only concerned with situations where the firm, 
individually, faces an inelastic demand curve. 
REVISTA DO IBRAC Volume 22 - Número 2 - 2016 
49 
against abusive (and not only excessive) pricing, if the demand curve faced by 
the firm in question is inelastic and the firm has substantial market power.  
 
 
References 
ABBOTT, Frederick M. Excessive pharmaceutical prices and competition law: 
doctrinal development to protect public health. Available at 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=2719095>. Accessed on August 27, 2016. 
AKMAN, Pinar; GARROD, Luke. When are excessive prices unfair? 
Available at <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1578181>. Accessed on September 14, 
2016. 
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION; DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE. 
Horizontal Merger Guidelines. Available at <https://www.ftc.gov/>. Accessed 
on September 16, 2016. 
GRADY, Mark F. Cases and materials on antitrust. Los Angeles [s.n.], 2016. 
1074 p. 
ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND 
DEVELOPMENT. Excessive prices. Available at 
<http://www.oecd.org/competition/abuse/49604207.pdf>. Accessed on August 
27, 2016.  
PADILLA, Jorge; EVANS, David S. Excessive Prices: Using Economics to 
Define Administrable Legal Rules. Available at 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=620402>. Accessed on September 11, 2016.  
POLLACK, Andrew. Drug goes from $13.50 a tablet to $750, overnight. The 
New York Times, New York, 20 Sept. 2015. Available at 
<http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/21/business/a-huge-overnight-increase-in-
a-drugs-price-raises-protests.html?_r=0>. Accessed on August 27, 2016. 
PITTMAN, Russell. Consumer Surplus as the Appropriate Standard for 
Antitrust Enforcement. Available at <http://ssrn.com/abstract=996643>. 
Accessed on September 15, 2016. 
POSNER, Richard. The social costs of monopoly and regulation. The Journal 
of Political Economy, Chicago, vol. 83, pp. 807-828, 1975. pp. 807-809. 
RAGAZZO, Carlos Emmanuel Joppert. A eficácia jurídica da norma de preço 
abusivo. Available at <http://works.bepress.com/carlos_ragazzo/16/>. 
Accessed on September 14, 2016.  
REVISTA DO IBRAC Volume 22 - Número 2 - 2016 
50 
 
___________. Preço abusivo, eficácia jurídica e análise econômica: afinal, 
onde está a cabeça de bacalhau? Revista do IBRAC, v. 18, p. 21-43, 2011. 
SIDAK, J. Gregory; TEECE, David J. Comments of J. Gregory Sidak and 
David J. Teece before the Federal Trade Commission & U.S. Department of 
Justice on the Horizontal Merger Guidelines Review Project. Available at < 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1504706>. Access on September 14, 2016.  
WILLIAMSON, Oliver E. Economies as an antitrust defense: The Welfare 
Tradeoffs. The American Economic Review, Pittsburgh, Vol. 58, pp. 18-36, 
1966  
___________. Economies as an antitrust defense revisited. The University of 
Pennsylvania Law Review, Philadelphia, Vol. 125, pp. 699-736, 1977. 
 
 
 
